What do they mean, they "could not have considered [the] series of events" that occurred in the Diaz execution, until they had happened?
Is this because they cannot legally consider a scenario of an execution going wrong until has has actually gone wrong in the exact way that defense counsel has warned it might?
It makes no sense -- they were warned in appeal after appeal that there were potential problems with the chemicals (the fact that veterinarians cannot use those chemicals to humanely end the lives of pets ought to have put hem on notice.)
They were warned that there were potential problems with the technical set-up (and lots of botched executions documented nation-wide.)
They knew that the DOC had changed the procedure, which they'd never do on their own volition had there not been some kind of a problem along the way.
So why couldn't they consider it until now?
If the FSC should not be the institution tasked with the responsibility of being the checks-and-balances to the FL lethal injection procedure, just who the fuck should?
Supreme Court of Florida
MONDAY, APRIL 16, 2007
CASE NO.: SC06-1241
Lower Tribunal No.: 81-170-CF-A-01
IAN DECO LIGHTBOURNE vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
This case is before the Court on an appeal of a summary denial of a successive
motion for postconviction relief and a denial of a request for additional public records.
We affirm the trial court's order denying relief and the request for public records
without prejudice to Lightbourne litigating the related issues currently pending in the
circuit court pursuant to this Court's December 14, 2006, relinquishment order in
Lightbourne v. McCollum, SC06-2391.
Lightbourne's conviction and death sentence were affirmed by this Court in
1983 and since that time Lightbourne has filed several motions for postconviction
relief that have been ultimately denied. See Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d 431,
434-36 (Fla. 2003) (detailing Lightbourne's postconviction proceedings). In his most
recent motion, filed in February 2006, Lightbourne alleged that his rights under the
Vienna Convention were violated when police failed to inform him of his right to
contact the Bahamian consulate or notify the consulate of his detention and arrest. He
also alleged that Florida's lethal injection statute and current protocols violate both the
Florida and United States Constitution, and filed requests for additional public records
related to this claim.
As to his claim under the Vienna Convention, we affirm the denial of relief
based on Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2003) and Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). As to Lightbourne's lethal injection claim, we
CASE NO. SC06-1241
affirm the summary denial by the trial court based on our decision in Diaz v. State,
945 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2006), which addressed the precise issues raised by
Lightbourne in his February 2006 motion. However, as a result of Angel Diaz's
execution by lethal injection, a series of events occurred that the trial court could not
have considered in denying Lightbourne's motion. The impact of those events on the
issue of the constitutionality of Florida's lethal injection procedures is currently being
litigated in the circuit court pursuant to this Court's relinquishment order in
Lightbourne v. McCollum, SC06-2391. Accordingly, we conclude that the better
course is to allow that case to proceed, in which Lightbourne has reasserted his public
records request and in which an evidentiary hearing will be held in May 2007.
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and
BELL, JJ., concur.
A True Copy
ROCK E. HOOKER
SUZANNE MYERS KEFFER
KENNETH S. NUNNELLEY
HON. CARVEN D. ANGEL, JUDGE
HON. DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN, CLERK