Saturday, 2 February 2008

Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and Execution

http://www.floridasupport.us/Baze/roundtable.htm

http://www.floridasupport.us/Baze/roundtableTranscript.pdf


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Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and Execution

1. Introduction

DR. ATUL GAWANDE: Welcome to a Perspective Roundtable from the New England

Journal of Medicine. I am Atul Gawande, a staff surgeon at the Brigham and Women’s

Hospital here in Boston and an associate professor at the Harvard Medical School and the

Harvard School of Public Health.

In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection as a method of carrying

out the death penalty, in the belief that it would be more humane than electrocution. The

design of the original protocol for the procedure was written quickly, without any prior

study, by A. Jay Chapman, Oklahoma’s chief medical examiner at the time. And

Chapman’s approach became the de facto standard, as other states followed Oklahoma in

switching to the new method.

That method and the attempt it represents to medicalize execution, in order to make it

more morally acceptable, have led to ongoing tensions between the legal community and

the medical community over whether physicians and other health care professionals

should be involved in the process of putting convicted criminals to death.

On January 7, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Baze v. Rees, the

case of two Kentucky death-row inmates who argued that the current three-drug lethalinjection

protocol violates the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment guarantees against cruel

and unusual punishment.

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With me today to discuss this important case and its implications for the health care

community, we have Professor Deborah Denno, Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law

at Fordham University School of Law and an expert on death-penalty law, Dr. Bob

Truog, professor of medical ethics, anesthesiology, and pediatrics at Harvard Medical

School and also a coauthor of a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the lethalinjection

protocol, as currently constituted, does violate the ban on cruel and unusual

punishment. And we also have Dr. David Waisel, associate professor of anesthesiology at

Harvard Medical School and also the author of a much-discussed article arguing that

physicians should be involved in executions, in order to relieve suffering. Thank you, all

three of you, for joining today.

2. The Lethal-Injection Protocol

DR. GAWANDE: I want to start with you, Professor Denno. Now, as I understand it, the

case of Baze v. Rees doesn’t ask if the death penalty is unconstitutional; it doesn’t ask

whether lethal injection is unconstitutional in general; it asks only whether the specific

formula used in the state of Kentucky is unconstitutional. So the puzzle of it, to me as a

doctor, and to plenty of people who are not lawyers, is what is the big deal about this

case?

PROFESSOR DEBORAH DENNO: Well, the big deal about this case is immediately

when the method was adopted, A. Jay Chapman conceded that there were problems with

this formula. There certainly have been problems within the 30 years that the formula has

been examined and used. And now the Supreme Court is confronting that. The biggest

problem with the formula is the second chemical, pancuronium bromide, that is a

paralytic agent. There seems to be no real reason for its use. There’s evidence that it

paralyzes an inmate, so that inmate is not able to — to express himself if in fact he’s

suffering from the effects of the other chemicals.

DR. GAWANDE: So then, let me ask a little bit about the formula, Dr. Waisel. Can you

describe that three-drug protocol and how it’s at least supposed to work?

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DR. DAVID WAISEL: Yes. The three-drug protocol is based, at least a great deal, on

what was considered a normal induction of anesthesia when it was developed. First

comes thiopental, also known as sodium thiopental or pentothal, which is a barbiturate,

which is designed to put you to sleep, create amnesia and anesthesia. Second comes

pancuronium bromide, which is designed to paralyze the muscles. And the third drug,

which is not a drug used in anesthesia, is potassium chloride, which is designed to rapidly

stop the heart. The doses used are massive compared to the doses that would be used in a

normal anesthetic induction.

DR. GAWANDE: You raised, Dr. Truog, whether these are the right drugs in the first

place, in your brief.

DR. ROBERT TRUOG: We’ve taken a pretty strong stand that paralytic agents have no

role in end-of-life care. The concern, at the end of life, is that they can mask the

behavioral signs that we look to, as to whether or not a patient is comfortable. And we are

deeply committed to making sure that patients are comfortable and as free of pain and

suffering as possible during the dying process. And since we have medications that do

relieve pain, that do sedate perfectly adequately, there’s no need to be introducing

paralytic agents into end-of-life care.

DR. GAWANDE: One thing that came up in the course of the oral arguments before the

Supreme Court was: Why do they administer pancuronium as part of the protocol? Can

you explain a little bit about the thought that emerged from their discussion about this,

Professor Denno?

PROFESSOR DENNO: Well, according to the state, pancuronium bromide is used in

order to enhance the dignity of the inmate who’s dying, because evidence came out that

without pancuronium there might be some jerking or involuntary movements that would

disturb some of the witnesses. So this would enhance the dignity. That I find problematic,

and Justice Stevens certainly did.

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DR. GAWANDE: Dr. Truog, is there a medical reason behind it? And has it lasted only

just because of this until-now-unstated role of making things look dignified?

DR. TRUOG: Well, from the point of view of the inmate, the argument seems bizarre, at

best. You know, imagine saying to the inmate, “You have a choice. You can either be

assured of a pain-free death and you may have some twitching and grimacing, or we can

expose you to the risk of an excruciating death, but we’ll make sure that you don’t twitch

or grimace.” I can’t imagine that an inmate would actually consider that to be a real

choice.

So if we’re talking about the dignity of the inmate, it’s only in the eyes of those who are

watching that — and, in fact, you know, if that’s all you cared about, don’t even bother

with any of the other drugs, just paralyze the inmate. They will look just as peaceful. So I

think it’s completely specious and has no weight at all.

The number one alternative that’s been proposed has been a very large dose of a

barbiturate. And, you know, I know that there’s a number of experts who have said that 2

or 3 or 5g of pentothal is absolutely going to be lethal. The fact is that, at least in this

country, if there’s anyone who’s ever had experience with giving a huge dose of

pentothal and watching an otherwise healthy person die — now, I’d be very interested in

knowing the circumstances — I mean the fact is none of us have any experience with

this. And my concern is that if you look at a country where they really do have some

experience with it, their findings are pretty concerning.

So, if we go to Holland, where euthanasia is legal, and we look at a study from 2000 of

535 cases of euthanasia, I was stunned to see that in 69% of those cases, they used a

paralytic agent. Now, what do they know that we haven’t figured out yet? I think what

they know is that it’s actually very difficult to kill someone with just a big dose of a

barbiturate. And in fact they report that in 6% of those cases, there was problems with

completion — you know, getting the person dead. And in — what was it? — I think five

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of those, the person actually woke up, came back out of coma, you know, despite an

intention to give a lethal dose.

3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

DR. GAWANDE: Professor Denno, in turning to this three-drug protocol back in 1977,

one of the things you’ve written is you said, “The law turned to medicine to rescue the

death penalty.” What did you mean by that?

PROFESSOR DENNO: By virtue of coming up with a method of execution that makes

an inmate look serene, comfortable, and sleeping during the death process, by virtue of

using a paralytic agent, the death penalty in this country was rescued. The humane

application of a method of execution was a key goal. And the presence of doctors, their

involvement, and the association with medicalizing the procedure enhanced its

Constitutional acceptability.

DR. GAWANDE: What does it mean to be not cruel and not unusual punishment?

PROFESSOR DENNO: This is what the petitioner was asking the court to do: “Please

provide us some Eighth Amendment guidance, so states can know how to judge whether

lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment.” So the court is in the position, or at

least we hope, of answering this question.

The Eighth Amendment has never said, nor have the petitioners ever argued, that

executions are to be pain-free. The question is whether or not that pain is unnecessary,

whether there are alternatives.

DR. GAWANDE: Chief Justice Roberts asked, “Do you agree that if the protocol is

properly followed, that there is no risk of pain?” And the attorney for the prisoners

waffled. And I think he waffled because it’s a medical question. And so I want to turn to

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both of you, Dr. Waisel and Dr. Truog. What’s your take on the answer? Is there no risk

of pain with the three-drug protocol, if properly followed?

DR. WAISEL: Define “properly followed.” In other words, the protocols list that this

should happen and that should happen. But does that mean if everything happens

correctly, there are no problems with insertion of intravenous catheters, if there’s no

problems with mixing up the medications, there’s no problem with delivery of the

medications, then yes, it would be pain-free.

DR. TRUOG: I think I agree with Dave. You know, thousands of times, every day,

people are getting anesthetics around this country. Many of them involve the use of

paralytic agents. The risk of awareness under anesthesia is very, very small. It does occur,

and that’s, you know, that’s the risk of the anesthesia being too light under the cover of a

paralytic agent. And that’s what, you know, anesthesiologists live in fear of that

happening. And fortunately, it occurs very, very rarely.

4. Risk of Errors

DR. TRUOG: I think the issue, here, is that people go to school for a long time and do

years of training in order to be able to do this well. And certainly, everything that I’ve

read is that the adequacy of the training for the people that are doing it in lethal injection

is nowhere near adequate.

DR. GAWANDE: So there is a practical empirical question, which is: How likely is it

that errors will occur with the current process of lethal injection? By one measure, there

have been 40 clear botched executions out of a little over 900, which suggests a 4 to 5%

rate of failure. But then, Dr. Waisel, you started to talk about other problems that occur

along the way, starting with drug preparation, where we’ve seen problems appear,

perhaps, at an even higher rate. What’s your sense of how often problems occur, and

what the problems are?

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DR. WAISEL: We have no idea what the error rate is, because there is no oversight,

there is no public reporting. So there’s no way of knowing what’s happening where. And

the information you hear worries me, that the process is of less concern. So, for example,

I believe the case was from Missouri, in which they pushed the three drugs, and the

inmate didn’t go to sleep. He was sitting there looking at them.

And he realized the strap holding the arm was functioning as a tourniquet, not permitting

the drugs through. So they loosened it up, all the drugs came in at once. Now in that case,

I’m highly confident that the inmate experienced a great deal of pain from the potassium

chloride. And yet I believe it was the sheriff who was quoted as saying, “Eh, no big deal.

It’s not like we hurt the guy,” or something like that. And so I think that your 4 to 5%

number is dramatically underestimated.

Second, I would argue that, you know, when we talk about medical error, we also talk

about the consequences of if that medical error occurs. We should approach this with the

gravest manner possible. And this should be done perfectly.

DR. GAWANDE: Dr. Truog, we’re talking about you put an IV in, you give some

medications, that’s a routine kind of procedure that occurs thousands of times a day in

any typical hospital across the country.

DR. TRUOG: First of all, putting an IV in is not as easy as it may sound. And being

certain that it continues to remain in the same place also requires, actually, quite a bit of

experience, because these catheters can become dislodged, they can go into the tissue,

and then they won’t work anymore. Furthermore, we know that many of these inmates,

by virtue of their past history of drug abuse or obesity or being muscular, can be very

difficult to start IVs in.

Now, in a hospital setting, we have a lot of different ways of approaching the situation

when we can’t get an IV in or it’s going to be difficult. Most commonly, we’ll just put in

a central venous line. But there again, that requires a great deal of training, far beyond

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anything that would be readily available outside of the medical profession. The mixing,

the administration of the medications, routine in any operating room in this country, but

far from routine if you haven’t done it before.

And indeed one of the mistakes that I know has occurred happened to me, as an

anesthesiologist early in my training, when I injected the paralytic agent too quickly after

the pentothal, and they precipitated in the tubing. The tubing turned into a piece of

concrete. Suddenly, I had no IV. And, you know, thank goodness I was surrounded by

very experienced anesthesiologists who stepped in, within moments had another IV, fixed

the problem, and it’s never happened to me since. I learned my lesson. But I know that

that has happened in executions, and it could be a disaster.

5. Physician Involvement

DR. GAWANDE: When Justice Ginsberg asked of the petitioners — she asked, “Is there

a way to ensure proper use of the three-drug regimen?” the petitioners said, “Yes, with

the direct involvement and control by medical professionals.” And so now, then, of

course we come to this fundamental question that all three of you have weighed in on in

various ways. And that’s whether physicians should, therefore, take charge to make death

less painful in these instances.

DR. GAWANDE: Dr. Truog, what’s your take on that, I think, fundamental question: If

you were to have to be executed, wouldn’t you rather have a capable, specialized

physician doing this job?

DR. TRUOG: Sort of as a philosopher, if I think of the kind of a hypothetical where you

have an inmate who is about to be executed and knows that this execution may involve

excruciating suffering, that inmate requests the involvement of a physician because he

knows that the physician can prevent that suffering from occurring, and if there is a

physician who is willing to do that, and we know from surveys that many are, I honestly

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can’t think of any principle of medical ethics that would say that that is an unethical thing

for the physician to do.

DR. GAWANDE: Let me ask a follow-up on that, because I’d be curious to hear from a

nonmedical person’s perspective, but also an expert in the law on this, how you take the

role that physicians should play in this. You’ve written a recent law review where you

would like physicians to actually play more of this role, at least in constituting the

protocol to minimize suffering. Is that still your take on what our role should be?

PROFESSOR DENNO: If we’re going to be executing people, I would prefer to have a

method of execution where a doctor did not have to be involved, where medical expertise

would not have to be necessary. If in fact we’re going to, however, have a method that

would be cruel and constitute suffering if we didn’t have doctor involvement, then it

suggests to me that if there are physicians in the country who are willing to be involved,

or medical personnel, then I would like to think that they would not be chastised or lose

their license or punished by the medical profession for volunteering to take part in an

execution, to relieve suffering.

DR. GAWANDE: Well, there is an argument that I think we have to grapple with.

Steven Miles has made it, a physician and medical ethicist. When he was looking into the

records of what happened at Abu Ghraib, the very exact same question happened. It was:

if you’re a prisoner who’s about to be tortured, wouldn’t you rather have a doctor

available, to help you survive the torture, so that it could be titrated in ways that avoid

killing you inadvertently and also provide some guidance on how it might be made more

effective in various ways?

DR. TRUOG: I’ve thought a lot about Steve Miles’ work on torture, and actually I

welcome the analogy to torture, because there’s been a lot written, there’ve been

symposia about whether physicians should participate in torture. And I think it all sort of

misses the point. Of course, physicians shouldn’t participate in torture. But,

fundamentally, it’s because torture is wrong. And this is sort of returning, now, to kind of

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my views about physician involvement in capital punishment. While I think at one level,

we can justify it, as Dave does very, very well, but I think it’s to miss the bigger picture. I

really believe that capital punishment is ethically wrong.

And, you know, I think that living in the bubble of the United States, as we do, it’s easy

to lose sight of just how much of an outlier our country is. You know, the United Nations

has recently voted to ban capital punishment worldwide. Over 100 countries have. We

stand among a small group of countries that still do capital punishment that I really don’t

think we want to be, you know, in their company.

6. Remedies

DR. GAWANDE: So then, when we come to this question of where can the remedy be

found, the directions that seem to be posed are we involve physicians more and let them

treat the prisoner as a patient, or we come up with alternative protocols that don’t involve

physicians at all. The judges in the oral arguments seemed very uncomfortable with

trying to reinvent the protocol, for the reasons Dr. Truog has just mentioned. That is, it’s

not clear that any alternative protocol has enough experience to show that it works 100%

of the time and it’s pain-free. And so the natural place the discussion tends to go is

towards trying to make sure there’s enough professional involvement. Is that right,

Professor Denno? Was there a disinclination among the justices to be reinventing the

protocol on the spot?

PROFESSOR DENNO: I think there was a disinclination. I think what became clear

during some of the arguments is there’s probably not enough information for the justices

to determine what the next direction should be. You know, my recommendation has been

that there be a panel of experts who would propose what would be a viable method of

execution and offer information that seemed to be sorely needed during the oral

arguments.

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DR. GAWANDE: I have to say, it makes me deeply concerned, though, imagining us

sitting around a table at a conference, trying to figure out various ways of executing

people, and then the prospect of what that becomes, that we either figure out that

physicians have to be continually actively involved, and we create a specialty of the

execution physician.

It may not be possible for the court to say that doctors would be allowed to really treat

inmates as patients. And so then my question to you, Professor Denno is: Is it a realistic

thing that a physician could treat an inmate as a patient and that the court would let them

control the protocol, make judgments about how to make the suffering less or more, and

leave them free to have that professional role?

PROFESSOR DENNO: I guess my best answer to you is that they’ve been doing that

for 30 years. There have been physicians, as you know, involved in lethal injection since

the very first execution in 1982 in this country, in the involvement of Dr. Ralph Gray. We

don’t, because of secrecy and the lack of information, we’ll never know, at least up to

this point, the full involvement of doctors. But we have many examples of doctors having

been involved — the doctor in Missouri, Dr. Carlo Musso in Georgia, etc., who have

made these kinds of discretionary judgments about drugs or chemicals and what should

be done.

DR. GAWANDE: So Dr. Truog, if the court says, “We need this to go to an expert

panel, with physicians, lawyers, public citizens, to determine a new protocol for

execution,” would you participate on that panel? And should other physicians participate

on that panel?

DR. TRUOG: I would not participate on that panel, because I don’t think that capital

punishment is ethical. I think other physicians should be free to participate on that panel.

And while I wouldn’t want to prejudge how they might come out, certainly, from

everything I’ve read, I can’t imagine that they are going to be able to develop an evidence

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base for any other approach that is likely to be successful without the immediate presence

of a physician. And then, I think we have to grapple with the ethics of that.

DR. GAWANDE: Dr. Waisel, can I ask you the same question? If they say there has to

be some expert panel weighing this question, would you participate on the panel to come

up with a better execution method?

DR. WAISEL: I agree that it should be wholly permissible for other physicians to

participate, if they wish. I would have to think about it very carefully. A large part would

be depending on the intellectual freedom involved in the panel, the ability to write a

dissenting opinion from what the panel comes up with, and moving away from certain

constraints that are put around this that seem not to permit what I would consider to be

successful ways of nonphysician involvement.

DR. GAWANDE: Well, a decision from the Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees is expected

this spring. And whatever the decision is, it is bound to have important implications for

physicians and the entire health care community about our role in punishment. I want to

thank all three of you for taking the time to sort through these issues, their complexities

— Professor Deborah Denno, from Fordham University School of Law, Drs. Robert

Truog and David Waisel from Harvard Medical School. For the New England Journal of

Medicine, I am Atul Gawande.

Discussion on LI - physician participation ONLINE NOW

Discussion on LI - physician participation ONLINE NOW

Go here :



http://www.nejm.org/Perspective-Roundtable/Lethal-Injection/video.html



http://www.nejm.org/Perspective-Roundtable/Lethal-Injection/

Physicians and executions


From the blog Capital Defense Weekly :


Physicians and executions

The New England Journal of Medicine has posted a roundtable on doctors and lethal injection. From the intro:

On January 14, 2008, the Journal hosted a videotaped roundtable discussion of the issues raised by Baze v. Rees, currently before the Supreme Court, that asks whether the three-drug protocol used to carry out the death penalty by lethal injection causes unnecessary pain and suffering in violation of the Constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Moderator Atul Gawande was joined by law professor Deborah Denno, anesthesiologist–ethicist Robert Truog, and anesthesiologist David Waisel. What follows are highlights of their discussion about lethal injection, the current protocol, possible alternatives, and the role of physicians and other health care professionals in putting convicted criminals to death. The video, along with a related reader poll and an interactive timeline, can be found at www.nejm.org.

Callahan Execution Stayed


Callahan Execution Stayed

The Supreme Court has just issued an order staying the execution in the case of James Callahan, which we wrote about earlier here. No dissents were recorded. The full text of the order can be found after the jump

ORDER IN PENDING CASE

07A630 CALLAHAN, JAMES V. ALLEN, COMM’R, AL DOC, ET AL.

The application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice Thomas and by him referred to the Court is granted pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Related Posts


Thursday, 31 January 2008

The stay application to USSC in Callahan

CAPITAL CASE

EXECUTION DATE

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JAMES CALLAHAN,

Petitioner,

RICHARD ALLEN, et al.,

Respondents.

CAPITAL CASE

EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 31,2008 AT 6PM CST

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

Vincent R. FitzPatrick, Jr.

Counsel of Record for James Callahan

Heather K. McDevitt

Stephanie Cohen

WHITE & CASE LLP

1 155 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10036

(212) 819 - 8200

( JAN 3 0 2008

1I OSUFPFRICEEM OE FCMOUER CTL, EU.FSX. )

REOUEST FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

Petitioner, James Callahan, applies to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. tj 2201(f) for a

stay of his execution, currently scheduled for January 31,2008 at 6:OO pm CST. The

Eleventh Circuit decision reversing the opinion and order of the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Alabama that granted Mr. Callahan's Stay Motion is in Re: Richard Allen

v. Callahan, No. 08-1 0 100 (1 1th Cir. Jan. 29,2008) (the "Eleventh Circuit Opinion"), and is

attached to the Application as Appendix A. The decision of the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Alabama in McNair v. Allen, et aL, Nos. 2:06-cv-695-WKW, 2:06-cv-

WKW, 2007 WL 4463489, Mem. Op. and Order (M.D.Ala. Dec. 14,2007) (opinion granting

motion for stay of execution) ("District Court Opinion"), and is attached to the Application as

Appendix B. In support of his application, Mr. Callahan states as follows.

Mr. Callahan filed this Eighth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of lethal

injection in Alabama over fifteen months ago. His execution date was set only after his case was

days away from being tried, but had to be continued solely because the State announced, on the

eve of trial, that it was revising its execution procedures. He promptly moved for a stay over 10

weeks ago, which was granted by the District Court on December 14,2007. That stay has been

in place since the middle of December. The State waited until December 28,2007 to file a

notice of appeal and until January 4,2008 to file its main brief to the Eleventh Circuit. Mr.

Callahan filed his opposing brief on January 18,2008. At approximately 6: 18 prn yesterday, just

48 hours before the execution date that had been set (and stayed), a divided panel of the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Wilson, dissenting) ruled that Mr. Callahan's claim is barred by

the "applicable" statute of limitations -- a claim that neither was before that Court on the State's

appeal of the District Court Opinion granting the stay (indeed, the State did not even raise the

statute of limitations in its arguments to the District Court opposing the stay), nor was pursued as

an interlocutory appeal by the State when the District Court denied summary judgment on statute

of limitations grounds on November 16,2007. Yesterday's Eleventh Circuit majority Opinion

presents a novel theory, far from settled, that effectively will be shielded from review should the

execution proceed tomorrow. The Opinion did not otherwise deal with the well-reasoned

decision by Judge Watkins in the District Court and, putting aside the statute of limitation issue,

left intact his findings that Mr. Callahan met all requirement for a stay, including a showing of a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his lethal injection challenge.

Given this backdrop, Mr. Callahan respectfully seeks a stay of execution from this Court

in order to enable him to timely file a petition of writ of certiorari from the Opinion vacating the

stay. Given the exigencies created by the timing and circumstances of the decision, Mr. Callahan

also attaches to this Application his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion

for Sunmary Judgment (Exhibit C) and the District Court's November 16,2007 Memorandum

Opinion and Order denying summary judgment, inter alia, on statute of limitations grounds

(Exhibit D), for further amplification of the statute of limitations arguments.

Mr. Callahan seeks a stay of execution from this Court on either of two alternative

grounds. First, pending the filing, consideration, and disposition of a petition for a writ of

certiorari before judgment to review the Eleventh Circuit Opinion. See 28 U.S.C. 1257(a).

Second, to preserve this Court's jurisdiction to review the petition for a writ of certiorari under

the ordinary time frame, rather than in a matter of hours, a situation created by the delay of the

State (in taking a notice of appeal and briefing) and the Eleventh Circuit (in ruling) on the appeal

of the District Court's stay. Again, it bears emphasis that Mr. Callahan filed his motion for stay

over two months ago, and filed this lethal injection suit overjifteen months ago, long before an

execution date was sought or set. For these reasons and because, as the District Court found, the

rest of the traditional factors for granting a stay of execution favor Mr. Callahan, the Court

should stay Callahan's execution pending the filing of and disposition of a petition of writ of

certiorari, or in the alternative, stay his execution pending this Court's decision in Baze.

PROCEDUWL HISTORY

1. On October 1 1,2006 -- over fifteen months ago -- Mr. Callahan filed a complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 in the United States District Court, Middle District of Alabama,

Northern Division, challenging the constitutionality of Alabama's method of execution by lethal

injection. Mr. Callahan alleges violations of his right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2. The District Court aptly summarized the highlights of the subsequent procedural

history:

The trial in this matter was scheduled to begin on October 3, 2007. Eight days

before the trial date, on September 25,2007, defense counsel announced that the

defendants would be making changes to the State's execution protocol - the

constitutionality of which comprises the subject matter of this litigation. On the

same date, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Baze case.

Baze v. Rees, -U .S. ,128 S. Ct. 34 (2007).' On September 27,2007,

Governor Bob Riley granted a forty-five day reprieve to another condemned

prisoner "to allow the Alabama Department of Corrections sufficient time to

make modifications to its lethal injection protocol." (Doc. # 124-2.)

The parties were ready for trial, but on September 28,2007, the court was

compelled to continue the case. (Doc. # 130.) A new trial date was tentatively set

because it was not known when the State would complete the modification to its

protocol, whether the plaintiffs would agree that the modification alleviated any

constitutional violation, and, frankly, what effect the grant of certiorari in Baze

would or should have on pending chalIenges to lethal injection.

On October 26,2007, the defendants filed a revised lethal injection protocol. Five

days later, on October 3 1,2007, the Alabama Supreme Court set Callahan's

execution date for January 3 1,2008. After holding a status conference with the

' The questions presented in Buze include the correct standard by which the constitutionality of methods of

execution should he adjudged and whether Kentucky's three-dmg protocol, which is similar to Alabama's lethal

injection protocol at issue here, violates that standard.

-3 -

parties, the trial was continued generally in anticipation of additional limited

discovery and the filing of the instant motion.

(District Court Opinion at 1-3 .)

3. On November 13,2007, Mr. Callahan filed with the Alabama Supreme Court a

motion to vacate the execution date order entered by that court. He filed a supplemental brief in

support thereof on November 16,2007. To date, the Alabama Supreme Court has not ruled on

that motion.

4. On November 19, 2007, two and a half months before yesterday's decision, Mr.

Callahan filed a motion for stay of execution with the District Court and requested, in the

alternative, a hearing on, and determination of, the merits, without the need of a stay.

5. On December 14,2007, the District Court issued an order granting Mr. Callahan's

-

motion for stay.

6. Two weeks later, on December 28,2007, the State of Alabama filed a notice of

appeal.

7. On January 4,2008, the State of Alabama filed in the Eleventh Circuit a Brief of

Appellants.

8. On January 18,2008, Mr. Callahan filed Appellee's Brief in Opposition.

9. On January 24,2008, one week later, the State filed its reply brief.

10. Yesterday (January 29,2008), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court and

vacated the stay of execution, solely on the grounds that Mr. Callahan's claim is barred by a twoyear

statute of limitation. Counsel received this opinion yesterday after the close of business by

electronic mail at 6: 18 pm EST.

RELIEF SOUGHT

11. Mr. Callahan seeks an Order from this Court for a stay of execution pursuant to

28 U.S.C. $220l(f), which provides in part:

In any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court is subject to

review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, the execution and

enforcement of such judgment or decree may be stayed for a reasonable

time to enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari from the

Supreme Court.

12. Mr. Callahan asks this Court to stay his presently scheduled execution to allow

him to timely file a petition for writ of certiorari.

13. Callahan's petition for a writ of certiorari will present the following questions:

A. Did the Eleventh Circuit err in vacating an otherwise presumptively valid

stay of execution on the basis that, even where it must be presumed that the method of

execution would otherwise be found to be unconstitutional, an execution may proceed

because the entire claim was barred by a rigid rule that a 42 U.S. § 1983 claim

challenging a method-of-execution is barred by a two-year state based statute of

limitations that begins to run at the conclusion of state direct review (or, as in this case, at

a later date when a new method of execution applies), regardless of any other factors.

B. Should a statute of limitations defense be available in a 5 1983 method of

execution. challenge despite the otherwise filly applicable equitable doctrines governing

the timeliness of such claims.

C. Can the statute of limitations ever run on a 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 claim that is

not ripe for review because the plaintiff is challenging the future harm that would be

caused by an unconstitutional execution method the implementation of which remains

uncertain?

STANDARDS AmNDANT TO GWTING OF A STAY OF EXECUTION

14. The authority of the courts below to enter a stay of execution has been analyzed

under the following four-part test:

(1) whether there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) whether the requested action is necessary to prevent irreparable injury;

(3) whether the threatened injury outweighs the harm the stay or injunction would inflict

upon the non-rnovant; and

(4) whether the requested action would serve the public interest.

Rutheiford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 979 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (Rutherford 11) (Wilson, J.,

dissenting); Hill v. McDonough, U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2096,2104 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65

(internal quotations omitted).

15. None of the traditional four factors that must be considered on a stay motion,

universally applied by every circuit, necessarily outweighs the other. As a general matter, some

circuits consider that "[tlhe irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the harm to the defendant are the

two most important factors," Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353,359 (4th

Cir. 1991), to the degree such that if the balancing of hardships favor the plaintiff, a lesser

showing on the merits is required. "In determining whether the plaintiff should prevail, the court

balances the evidence proffered for each element. Hence, a heavier showing on one or more of

the criteria will reduce the weight of proof required for the other factors." Mark Dunning Indus.,

fnc., 830 F. Supp. at 15 10. The greater the relative hardship to the party seeking the preliminary

injunction, the less probability of success must be established by the party. See Clear Channel

Outdoor Inc, v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 8 10,s 13 (9th Cir. 2003).

6 Mr. Callahan meets the standards attendant to the granting of a stay of his

execution. Each of the criteria is satisfied in this case.

ARGUMENT

I. There Is a Substantial Likelihood That Mr. Callahan Will Show That

The Statute of Limitations Holding of The Eleventh Circuit Is Wrong

17. As mentioned above, all of the requirements for a stay of execution have

presumptively been met by Mr. Callahan, as determined by the District Court, because the

Eleventh Circuit did not address any of the well-reasoned findings to that effect, including the

fact that Mr. Callahan has made the requisite showing of probable success on the merits. McNair

v. Allen, 2007 WL 4463489, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 14,2007) Judge Watkins' findings as to

these elements are at this stage presumptively correct, because the divided Eleventh Circuit

(Judge Wilson dissenting) found an "abuse of discretion" solely on the basis that he supposedly

erred in not denying the stay on statute of limitations grounds. Thus, this application for a stay is

made on behalf of an applicant who has for these purposes presumptively shown that the method

of execution the State intends to subject him to tomorrow violates the Eighth Amendment. If

this Court does not grant a stay, the presumptively unconstitutional execution will take place

tomorrow. But as Judge Wilson's dissent below and other cases show, the new statute of

limitations holding is clear error and contrary to established law. Therefore, the interests of

justice demand that a stay of execution be issued at least until Mr. Callahan has had an

opportunity to file, and this Court consider, a petition for writ of certiorari fully addressing the

erroneous Eleventh Circuit decision. (This is particularly so in light of this Court's decision to

consider the lethal injection issue in granting certiorari in Baze v. Rees, - U . S . , 128 S.

Ct. 34 (2007), and in this Court' subsequent practice with respect to stays of executions, as more

fully discussed below.)

18. Moreover, the appropriateness of a stay is all the more obvious because the statute

of limitations argument was not even properly before the Eleventh Circuit, a point that Mr.

Callahan raised below, but which the Eleventh Circuit did not even address.

19. The time constraints in this case that were clearly created by the State, as set forth

above, do not permit a full explication of the statute of limitations issue at this point because Mr.

Callahan will be executed tomorrow unless these papers are filed on Mr. Callahan's behalf and

this Court acts. Therefore, we will here simply summarize the essential aspects of the errors in

the Eleventh Circuit's holding and otherwise make the references set forth above.

20. To summarize, the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning and its conclusion with respect to

the statute of limitations are deeply flawed, clearly erroneous, and contrary to law. Except for

the Sixth Circuit decision in Cooey which has a muddled history (not cited by the Eleventh

Circuit majority), an unclear effect even in the Sixth Circuit, and is stillpending before this

Court on a Petition for Writ of Certiorari that raises the identical statute of limitations point

involved here, Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. March 2,2007) (finding that statute of

limitations barred plaintiffs claim) (Gilman, J., dissenting); order refusing to vacate stay of

execution, Strickland v. Biros, 127 S. Ct. 1873 (March 20,2007); rehearing en banc denied,

Cooev v. Strickland, 489 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. June 1,2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting, Martin,

Daughtrey, Moore, Cole and Clay, J.J., joining in dissent); petition for cert. filed (US. Aug. 29,

2007), the courts that have considered the statute of limitation arguments advanced by the State,

and adapted by the majority Eleventh Circuit Opinion have rejected those arguments. See, e.g.,

Jones Y . Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Alderman v. Donald, No. 1 :07-cv-1474-

BBM (N.D.G a. July 30,2007) (Martin, J.) (denying Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss on the basis

of statute of limitations). See also Grayson v. Allen, 2007 WL 1491009 at *5 n. 9 (M.D. Ala.

May 2 1,2007). They have done so for good reason.

2 1. Judge Wilson in his dissent below (pages 2 1-24) makes this clear and succinctly

states that Mr. Callahan's position is correct.

For this and the other reasons set forth in the decisions and Briefs previously

referred to, it is clear that the majority in the Eleventh Circuit erred in its

conclusion that the statute of limitations began to run at the time that Mr.

Callahan selected lethal injection as a method by which he would be put to death

(and expired two years later). At the very least, Callahan's execution should be

stayed until he has an opportunity to file a petition for writ of certiorari on this

question and the Court has time to consider it. This is particularly true given the

fact that in this case there is a presumption that Mr. Callahan has otherwise met

all of the requirements for a stay including a showing of a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits.

22. In fact, as other courts have recognized, basic tort principles make clear that the

--

majority's reasoning was in error. Mr. Callahan's claim for an injunction to prevent future harm

is not subject to the statute of limitations because a claim, even if actionable, cannot accrue until

the harm occurs. A claim is considered ripe, meaning suitable for judicial review, at the point at

which it can give rise to a lawsuit, whether that suit is in law seeking damages for a harm that

has occurred already, or in equity seeking an injunction to prevent a harm that will occur in the

future. See Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 n.3 (M.D. Ala. 2007). However, a claim

that is actionable is not necessarily a claim that has accrued for statute of limitations purposes.

Id. at 1 149. For instance, a plaintiff can be the subject of a tortious act at one point in time and

yet not able to reasonably discover the harm caused by that act, and the source of that harm (the

tortious act), until some later time. In theory, the harm is actionable at the point of actual injury,

but it does not accrue, and the statute of limitations clock does not begin to tick, until the harm

can reasonably be discovered. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 1 11, 122 (1979). Similarly,

when a plaintiff is seeking an injunction, he is seeking to enforce a right in court. Although his

claim may be ripe for judicial review, the claim may not have accrued for statute of limitations

purposes if no harm has yet occurred Jones, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.

23. Not all tortious acts are suitable for equitable relief. In fact, in most tort actions,

the harm has already accrued, and the relief sought is not equity, but damages. See Albertson v.

T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that "a cause of action for a

tort accrues when there has been an invasion of the plaintiffs legally protected

interest.. .ordinarily, this invasion occurs at the time the tortuous act is committed" (emphasis

added) (internal citations omitted)). However, the very remedy and language of 42 U.S.C. 5

1983 presupposes that there are claims where the harm has not yet accrued, and that the purpose

of the § 1983 suit is not to remedy the harm, but to prevent the harm from occurring in the first

instance. Mitchurn v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972). As the Court stated in Mitchum:

"Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in 9 1983 actions, by

expressing authorizing a "suit in equity7' as one of the means of redress." Id. The court further

noted that "federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some ci~cumstances

be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights."

-Id.

24. Both the availability of equity suits under ij 1983 and the Supreme Court's

recogcition of the importance of federal injunctive relief suggest that a 5 1983 claim need not

have accrued to be actionable. Because statutes of limitations attach only to accrued claims, and

4 1983 claims seeking injunctions have not yet accrued, such claims are not subject to a statute

of limitations. See Jones, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. As Judge Thompson stated in the Jones

opinion, "There is simply no reason why, in order for a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief to

prevent a future unconstitutional harm from occurring, the statute-of-limitations clock must

already be ticking." u. Mer all, statutes of limitations are designed to protect against "stale

claims." Nat71 R.R. Passenger Corn. v. Mornan, 536 U.S. 101, 125 (2002). But an action

seeking an injunction to protect against an imminent future harm is by definition not "stale", it

cannot be in the "too-distant past." Jones, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51 n.4.

25. In establishing when the claim accrues, Judge Thompson in Jones recognized that

a claimant's knowledge of possible harm is not the constitutional violation at stake. The

knowledge of the potential for harm from Alabama's execution procedure is not a constitutional

violation. Rather, it is the implementation of that procedure that raises the risk of a constitutional

violation he will suffer if he is subjected to Alabama's execution protocol. As such, the claim

could not possibly accrue for statute-of-limitations argument in this situation "anomalous to say

-- the least." Id. at 1 145. Judge Watkins correctly followed the reasoning of Jones in his decision

denying summary judgment below, McNair v. Allen, 2007 WL 4106483, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Nov.

16,2007), and his decision in Grayson, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2007), for further

discussions on this point we refer to those opinions.

26. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit erred because the courts already have more

than enough flexibility in considering the timelines of a 9 1983 challenge to a method of

execution in the body of equitable principle and concepts of dilatoriness already established as

applying to such claim.

27. Moreover, a rigid statute of limitations rule would contradict the underlying logic

of evolving standards of decency. The Supreme Court has long made clear that the Eighth

Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)

(Warren, C.J.). It is through this framework that numerous punishments once deemed

constitutional were later found to violate the Eighth Amendment. S e e , . , Atkins v. Virginia,

536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning the execution of mentally retarded offenders thirteen years after

ruling that the practice did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551

(2005) (banning the execution of juvenile offenders sixteen years after ruling that the practice did

not violate the Eighth Amendment).

28. Any statute of limitations for tj 1983 lethal injection claims would be susceptible

to a situation in which the nation's standards of decency evolved between the end of the statute

of limitations period and the actual implementation of the execution protocol. However, capital

cases take years to proceed from the conclusion of the direct appeal to execution; in that time,

Eighth Amendment standards of decency, which by definition evolve over time, could well

change.

29. Even a later triggering date - for example, the conclusion of the claimant's federal

habeas action - would risk this problem. A claimant might file a successive habeas action, or the

state in which he is under a death sentence might delay in setting an execution date, or even

temporarily halt executions. See, e.g., Fla. Exec. Order No. 260 @ec. 15, 2006), available at

h t t p : / / s u n 6 . d r n s . s t a t e . f l . u s / e o g - n e w / e o g / o e c t i o n , p d f

(suspending executions by lethal injection pending completion of Governor's Commission

investigation and implementation of necessary revisions). Any statute of limitations on an

Eight11 Amendment-based lethal injection claim could prevent a claimant from having his claim

measured by contemporary standards of decency, undermining the principle of evolving

standards of decency.

30. Of course the specific manner in which lethal injection is carried out in any given

state can and does change. It did, in fact change in Alabama just months ago: consider very

simply the fact that the method to be applied to Mr. Callahan himself changed in the midst of the

proceedings on his claim in the District Court below, and in fact delayed his trial.

3 1. For all these reasons the Eleventh Circuit decision is simply wrong on the statute

of limitation holding. A stay must be issued to give Mr. Callahan an opportunity to hlly address

this complex issue and have this Court fully consider it in a petition for writ of certiorari.

11. The Execution Also Should Be Staved in Light of Baze

32. A stay of execution also should issue given the pendency in this Court of the &

case and this Court's practice in granting or upholding stays of execution in lethal injection cases

since it granted certiorari in a.This Court has granted, or refused to vacate, stays of

execution in every case post-& that has raised a lethal injection challenge (except for the case

. - where the condemned was scheduled to be executed the same day as & was issued). See, e.g.,

Arthur v. Allen, No. 07-0342-WS-C, 2007 WL 2320069 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 10,2007), aff d No. 07-

13929, 2007 WL 2709942 (1 1 th Cir. Sept. 17,2007), stay granted pending disposition of petition

for writ of certiorari 128 S. Ct. 740, No. 07395,2007 WL 4248619 (Dec. 5,2007); Schwab v.

-Florid-a, S. C t . ,N o. 07A383,2007 WL 3380059 (Nov. 15,2007) (stay of execution

granted pending disposition of petition for writ of certiorari); Berry v. Epps, - S. C t . , NO.

07-7348 (07A367), 2007 WL 3 156229 (Oet. 30,2007) (same); Turner v. Texas, - S. Ct. -,

No. 07A272,2007 WL 2803693 (Sept. 27,2007) (same); Emmett v. Johnson, - S. Ct. -,

No. 07A304,2007 WL 3018923 (Oct. 17,2007) (stay of execution granted pending final

disposition of appeal by the Fourth Circuit or further order of the Court); Norris v. Jones, - $.

Ct. , No. 07A3 1 1,2007 WL 29991 65 (Oct. 16,2007) (denying application to vacate a stay

granted by the Eighth Circuit). See also In re Richard, 128 S. Ct. 37 (Sept. 25,2007) (denying

stay of execution and petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus and/or prohibition).

Further, courts in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, Texas, Delaware and Arkansas all have stayed

executions in light of Baze, while state officials in Texas and Oklahoma are voluntarily holding

off in seeking execution dates. In virtually all of these cases there are questions of dilatoriness

andlor statute of limitations. In fact, all or at least most, involve timeliness arguments by much,

stronger than such claims against Callahan here.

33. Consider, then, the implications for the appearance ofjustice and fairness if Mr.

Callahan were to be hastily executed after the State caused a delay of the trial on his claim and

dragged out its appeal from the order granting the stay that was necessary only because of that

delay, and it were later to be found in that the same three-drug cocktail employed by

Alabama violates the Eighth Amendment, or if this Court determined that a different standard for

adjudicating Eighth Amendment claims should be used than the standard employed by the

-- District Court for Mr. Callahan's claim. Mr. Callahan has as a strong interest in having his

claims adjudicated with the benefit of this Court's ruling in & as other condemned inmates

challenging the constitutionality of their states' lethal injection protocols whose executions

already have been delayed pending Baze.

34. Clearly, were this Court to render a decision in Baze that had the effect of finding

a method of execution unconstitutional, states would not be free to execute inmates with that

method on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run as to these claims. Without a stay

here, the State will have made an "end run3' around that fact by its timing tactics. Indeed, it

seems highly likely that Mr. Callahan would be the only person executed in the United States

during the pendency of as a result of the State's race to execute. Not only would that be a

gross injustice, it would undermine the jurisdiction of this Court and its interest in giving effect

to its decisions. That should not be allowed to happen.

CONCLUSION

USSC docket for the stay application in Callahan


No. 07A630
Title:
James Callahan, Applicant
v.
Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.
Docketed:
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case Nos.: (08-10100)

~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Jan 30 2008 Application (07A630) for stay of execution of sentence of death pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, submitted to Justice Thomas.



~~Name~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~Address~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~Phone~~~
Attorneys for Petitioner:

Vincent R. Fitzpatrick White & Case, LLP (212) 819-8200

1155 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 20036
Party name: James Callahan
Attorneys for Respondents:

J. Clayton Crenshaw Alabama State House (334) 242-7300

Office of the Attorney General

11 South Union Street

Montgomery, AL 36130-0152
Party name: Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Legislation in Alabama


From Standdown blog :



Legislation in Alabama

AL.com carries the AP dispatch, "Alabama senator to try death penalty moratorium for 8th time." The legislator is Senator Hank Sanders.

The Selma Democrat announced Tuesday that when the Legislature convenes Feb. 5, he will again sponsor legislation to place a three-year moratorium on executions in Alabama.

Legislative records show Sanders has been introducing the moratorium bill annually since at least 2001, but it has never been approved by the Senate, much less the House.

Sanders was joined at a windy outdoor news conference Tuesday by supporters of his bill. Judy Cumbee, first vice president of the Alabama New South Coalition, said the wind was symbolic.

"These are winds of change," she said as she brushed her hair out of her face.

Cumbee, Sanders and others said there is growing concern in Alabama about the fairness of the death penalty, and that is causing more people to support a moratorium while officials look at how the law is administered.

And:

Sanders' moratorium bill would do more than impose a three-year ban. It would also require changes in the way attorneys are appointed to represent indigent clients and would implement U.S. Supreme Court rulings against executing anyone who was mentally retarded or under 18 years old when their crime occurred.

The Anniston Star carries, "Alabama's legislative session: Our delegations priorities." State Representative Randy Wood (R-Anniston) announced that he will sponsor what appears to be a bill allowing th edeath penalty for non-homicidal child rape.

A second bill will give judges and district attorneys the option of seeking the death penalty in severe sexual-abuse cases involving children. It is a proven fact that sexual predators cannot be rehabilitated.

Similar legislation failed in last year's Alabama legislative session.

New test on lethal injection


From SCOTUS blog :

New test on lethal injection

Three weeks after the Supreme Court held a hearing on constitutional issues surrounding the lethal injection method of execution for murder, the Justices are expected to be asked later Wednesday whether to keep intact an informal but functional bar to such executions until a ruling is issued in the test case. Alabama legal sources said that attorneys for James Callahan, facing execution in that state at 6 p.m. Thursday, were preparing an application seeking to postpone the execution.

The Court has not permitted an execution to occur since shortly after it agreed to examine the lethal injection method in an order on Sept. 25.

U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins of Montgomery on Dec. 14 barred Callahan’s execution, concluding that it “would be a waste of judicial resources” if the Court were to go ahead and rule on the constitutionality of Alabama’s version of the three-drug execution protocol until the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Baze v. Kentucky (07-5439) — argued Jan. 7 in the Supreme Court. Thus, Judge Watkins opted for a stay. While he said that Callahan might prevail in a challenge to Alabama’s method under one theory, the judge was reluctant to decide the pending challenge on that basis while the Baze decision is awaited. That was the key factor in his decision to postpone the scheduled execution. The judge’s 10-page opinion can be downloaded here.

On Tuesday, however, the 11th Circuit Court, in a 2-1 ruling, lifted Judge Watkins’ order, clearing the way for the Thursday execution to proceed. Without examining Callahan’s challenge to Alabama’s execution formula, the majority found that he had filed his challenge too late. Callahan, the majority said, shoujld have begun his challenge before July 31, 2004 — two years after he first selected lethal injection as the method of his execution. “In light of the fact Callahan’s complaint was filed more than two years beyond the limitations period, the district court abused its discretion by entering a stay of execution. We now vacate that decision.” The Circuit Court’s 24-page opinion (which includes the dissent) can be downloaded here.

Callahan was sentenced to death in 1982 for the murder of a Jacksonville State University student, Rebecca Suzanne Howell, after kidnapping her at a landromat in Jacksonville, Ala. She was raped and murdered, and her body was dumped in Tallaseehatchee Creek. His conviction and death sentence became final on Oct. 1, 1990.

After other challenges in his case failed, he filed a civil rights lawsuit Oct. 11, 2006, claiming that Alabama’s lethal injection method of execution was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The trial of that lawsuit was due to begin in September of last year, but the state began a new review of the protocol. Judge Watkins, who also noted that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the Baze case, decided to postpone the trial.

The state issued a revised protocol last Oct. 26, and the state Supreme Court then set Callahan’s execution for Jan. 31. That was when Callahan began pursuing a delay.