Saturday, 5 April 2008

Costs grind New Mexico's capital punishment system to a halt


Costs grind New Mexico's capital punishment system to a halt

A helpful reader pointed me to this intriguing news from the Death Penalty Information Center's website:





In a potentially far reaching ruling, a trial judge in New Mexico has barred the state from seeking the death penalty because the legislature has failed to provide adequate funding for defense representation. The state's Attorney General, Gary King, agreed that the capital prosecution cannot go forward. After finding that funding for the defense was insufficient and raised constitutional problems, King wrote, "The state now confesses the motion to dismiss filed herein and cannot in good faith under these circumstances oppose the dismissal of the death penalty in these cases." State District Judge Neil Candelaria took the death penalty off the table for Reis Lopez and Robert Young, two inmates accused of killing a prison guard, because no money was appropriated for death penalty indigent defense during New Mexico’s 2008 Legislative Session, despite a unanimous warning from the state Supreme Court. The legislative session ended in February....

The court's ruling and the agreement by the Attorney General may mean that no further death penalty prosecutions can proceed in New Mexico without legislative action.

Analysis: Competency and the criminal trial


Analysis: Competency and the criminal trial



With Justice Antonin Scalia energetically and repeatedly making the case for a simple rule, the Supreme Court on Wednesday showed a reluctance to add a new layer of complexity to criminal trials when a person with a significant mental defect wants to act as his own defense lawyer. The core issue in Indiana v. Edwards (07-208) is whether states are constitutionally free to require that accused individuals have a higher level of mental capacity to represent themselves than is required for them simply to be put on trial with a lawyer at their side. As the lawyer for the state pressed for a two-level standard, most of the Court reacted with skepticism, first, about how to define a workable two-level test, and, second, about how that would complicate actual trials. Underlying much of the oral argument was a deep perplexity over how to conduct fair trials for persons with sub-standard mental capacity.

Scalia would come to dominate the argument, as he took the somewhat heroic position that those who represent themselves “bring it on themselves” if they botch the job, but at the same time suggesting that, in cases of actual trial disruption by a defendant who was making “a farce” of the proceeding, the trial judge should be free to act to prohibit that. Some members of the Court worried about whether such intervention by a trial judge would come too late, after “the damage had been done,” as Justices Stephen G. Breyer and David H. Souter put it. But it was far from clear that the answer the majority of the Court would embrace was a brand new constitutional rule on mental competency to self-represent.

Indiana’s solicitor general, Thomas M. Fisher, from early in his presentation, appeared to have difficulty winning support for the specific higher-level competency standard he was proposing: self-representation can be denied, before trial, “where the defendant cannot communicate coherently.” Justice Scalia promptly labeled that “a really vague test,” and other Justices soon suggested that it might turn out to exclude self-representation by those who have speech impediments on language deficiencies. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy suggested that what Indiana was arguing might lead to “more inefficiencies in the trial process.” And Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., expressed concern that a new rule on competency “is going to result in the denial of self-representation in a great number of cases.”

The Court, however, did not appear to be in agreement over when the trial judge would be allowed to make a finding that a person was not capable of defending himself: before trial, early in the trial, or after the proceedings had run for a time. While Justice Scalia vigorously objected to such a denial coming any time before trial, others — such as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg — indicated that, if pre-trial proceedings clearly showed an individual acting as his own lawyer would put on “gibberish” instead of any kind of real defense, a denial of self-representation might come then.

With the federal government in the case on Indiana’s side, Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Michael R. Dreeben urged the Court not necessarily to embrace the state’s proposal that ability to communicate be the test. The focus, he said, should be on whether “the state has a sufficient interest that would be served” by denying self-representation. Dreeben resisted Scalia’s point that there should be a single standard, so that if the judge finds an individual competent to be tried, he will know that individual could then represent himself. The government lawyer stressed the differing functions he perceived in the issue of competency to be tried and competency to self-represent. “The competency threshold,” Dreeben said, “does not fully address the very important interest that a state has in presenting to the world that the trial is a fair one.”

He fervently resisted the notion that the trial should be allowed to go forward with self-representation once competency to be tried was established. The state, Dreeben said, should not be forced “to have the train wreck [at the trial] occur, when the evidence is very firm and reliable that it will occur.”

The only member of the Court who openly expressed some sympathy for a clear-cut, two-level rule, with a higher level of compeency required for self-representation, was Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. He did so during questioning of Mark T. Stancil, the Washington, D.C., lawyer representing Ahman Edwards, the individual who won a right to represent himself on charges of murder and battery although he had a long history of a troubled mental state.

Roberts voiced some concern that, if there were not a two-level standard, the practical effect would be that, in order to avoid having a mentally defective individual representing himself, more judges would raise the standard for competency to stand trial so that fewer individuals with troubled mental conditions would simply not be put on trial at all. Stancil suggested that states should be left free to raise the competency standard, if that’s the way they opted to go to head off self-representation. The state, he added, should not also have the right to raise the self-representation standard, since “the state cannot cross to the other side of the courtroom and second guess the defendant’s decision” to self-represent.

Justice Breyer introduced some complexity into the discussion, suggesting that the Court define “a small class” of accused persons who are “disturbed” and who, because of that, can be expected to “do badly” if allowed to be their own lawyer. If those could be filtered out by a higher-level competency rule, Breyer said, “we’ve gone a long way to deal with a serious practical problem.” Stancil responded that trial judges have sufficient control over the conduct of their courtroom that they could “deal with trials that may descend into farce.”

Stancil responded that trial judges have significant control over their courtrooms “to deal with trials that may descend into farce.” But Justice Kennedy immediately voiced skepticism that disturbed individuals would abide by admonitions from the judge. Some defendants, Kennedy said, “don’t communicate. It’s two ships passing in the night or in the case of some defendants about five shipis passing in the night….It’s a practical matter; it’s a commonsense matter. We know what goes on, andwhatgoes on is very costly to the state and to the fairness of the trial.” Stancil responded that, in an ultimate situation of disruption, the right to self-represent could be taken away. That was the point at which Breyer, first, and then Souter suggested that disruptions may have damaged the trial so that it could not be continued at all.

Stancil did not back down. What trial judges “probably need,” he said, is encouragement to use the trial management rules that they have at their disposal. “You can nip it in the bud,” he arguebud. Stancil also told the Court that it could expand the concept of disruption of a trial that would justify taking away the right to self-represent. He had some trouble with Justice Souter about whether he was changing positions, but he finally made it clear that his argument did not mean that the judge could not order standby counsel into the case if the defendant did nothing but talk “total and complete nonsense.” And, he recovered some composure by pointing out that, if an individual “can’t get two words out to the jury” he might not be sufficiently competent even to stand trial — a poiint that supported his core argument in favor of a single standard. In fact, he told Souter directly that he thought the finding of competency to stand trial in this case was erroneous.

He finished by trying to reassure Justice Ginsburg that he was not seeking an expansion of the right of self-representation, but simply its enforcement in a case that involved a defendant who was of “feeble intellect.”

The Court is expected to decide the case by early summer.



8 Comments »



  1. Coincidentally, Scott Panetti — who was allowed to represent himself even though schizophrenic in the belief that Faretta so requires — was found competent to be executed today, on remand from last June’s decision.

    Comment by Kent Scheidegger — March 26, 2008 @ 5:43 pm

  2. Am I missing something? The right to paid-for counsel of one’s choosing is a necessary implication of language of the Framers, yet that right gives way to legitimate state interests (conflict free representation etc.–bar qualification). So why in the world would the right to self-representation, which has less textual basis, be less flexible?

    Does made by judge Constitutional law really require a farcical trial now and then?

    Comment by Sean O'Brien — March 26, 2008 @ 7:40 pm

  3. As I skim the joint appendix, I see a high school dropout, not quite so slow that he qualifies a mentally retarded, but functioning academically at the 4th grade level with communications difficulties in particular, who has a history of brain injury and mental illness, including most clearly, delusions of grandeur.

    No sane employer would allow him to be a supermarket cashier, to prepare a tax return, to take inventory by himself in a retail store, to work at a complaint desk, or to pitch cars to customers at a car dealership. Yet, a court allows him to take on all the job duties and responsibilities that we don’t allow anyone else who hasn’t completed 19 years of education and passed the bar exam to do.

    Letting a guy like him represent himself is simply morbid and humiliating. It doesn’t serve any high constitutional purpose and it denies the public the chance to know that the system has sentenced the right guy for the right crime, with a great deal of public expense incurred in the court process and then in the money spent on an inappropriate sentence.

    It used to be a crime to expose the natural failings of someone like this even if it was true under the criminal libel statutes. This approach flaunts those failings.

    If a jailer gave him a revolver with five of six rounds filled in his jail cell and then tried to blame the inmate for the tragedy that results when he shoots himself, the jailer would be fired and sued. Why should a judge allow this guy to put himself in an equivalent position? This is the moral equivalent of suicide by cop with the outside chance that a jury could do anything thrown into the mix for the general amusement of court watchers. Also, it is particularly worrisome to have self-representation when one of a court appointed advocate’s stronger arguments is probably his lack of mental health. We don’t let lawyers serve as advocates in cases where their own testimony on a material point is central to the outcome of the case.

    A better rule which would actually make rational sense would deny self-representation to anyone who isn’t capable of functioning at the bare minimum level that would be accepted for a maginally competent attorney. Short of that, it is hardly too much to expect that people who do the job of a lawyer ought to be high school graduates of, at least, average intelligence, who have demonstrated that they are rational actors?

    Scalia’s “bring it on themselves” theory only works if you live in a world of rational actors. The vast majority of people at least approximate that view. But, mentally ill, clinically stupid, marginally literate people who try to represent themselves in felony jury trials are not rational actors and don’t deserve a double punishment, once for whatever crime they did commit, and again for their mental illness.

    I’ll also note for Kent’s benefit, that I’m not arguing that this guy was necessarily entitled to an acquittal on the grounds of insanity, although that might have been one of the stronger available strategies at trial. Lots of people have mental illnesses and yet are not criminally insane. But the level of mental capacity necessary to know that it is wrong to rape and try to kill people is far lower than the level of mental capacity necessary to participate meaningfully as an advocate in a felony jury trial.

    Comment by Andrew Oh-Willeke — March 26, 2008 @ 10:01 pm

  4. Nice work, Andrew. But if the Court were to take your approach, it would have to face the fact that its habeas decisions are making these same defendants, made crazier by living in prison, with little or no access to lawbooks or computers, jump multiple successive changing procedural hurdles by themselves.

    Comment by Roger Friedman — March 26, 2008 @ 11:00 pm

  5. I fail to understand why “having a farcical trial” should be the determining factor rather than “having a minimally competent defence”.

    “But the level of mental capacity necessary to know that it is wrong to rape and try to kill people is far lower than the level of mental capacity necessary to participate meaningfully as an advocate in a felony jury trial.”

    Exactly. The rights of a defendant in between those two poles are surely better protected by mandating competent counsel than by allowing self-representation.

    Comment by Ginger Yellow — March 27, 2008 @ 8:13 am

  6. Nice work Andrew, you raise excellent points. Let me respond by telling you what worries me.

    The reason self-representation is important is because it goes to heart of what a fair trail actually is. Right now, the government has the power to arrest you, it now has the power to prosecute you, and it has the power to judge you. The only right, such as it is, is the right to defend yourself. You take that right away and then the whole thing really is a farce because the government controls the process from beginning to end. While it is unusual, history does record instances where the government was working in secret with the “defense” attorney. To my mind, a trial where the government controls the whole process is by definition unfair. What is to stop the government from declaring a person who is sane insane, appointing him a corrupt defense attorney, and then sending him off to death row. The only thing that’s stopping that possibility is the right to represent oneself.

    Andrew, you raise many excellent points. But history is replete with government abusing its power to defend the “weak,” especially when it gets to define both what “weak” is and how they are to be “defended”.

    Comment by Daniel Thomas — March 27, 2008 @ 1:24 pm

  7. Daniel,

    If one includes the judiciary as well as the prosecutor within the scope of the government, then yes, of course, “the government controls the process from beginning to end.” A government employee called a judge does control the process from beginning to end.

    Also, suppose that you are intentionally given an incompetent or collusive public defender. At least you have a basis for an appeal that can be raised in the first instance on a collateral attack, a form of attack that there are currently many independent pro bono lawyers will to engage in if you are convicted. In contrast, if you represent yourself, you may not collaterally attack your own incompetence if there is a strong right for dull, mentally ill people to represent themselves.

    Further, allowing someone incompetent to do so to represent themselves as a means of avoiding a corrupt defense attorney does not remedy the harm caused by the collusion. Even a right to be represented by a random member of the jury pool stricken by the prosecution for cause or under a pre-emptory challenge would be a more effective remedy in such a case, because that person would have no government links or personal animus against the defendant and would on average be an adult of average intelligence chosen by the defendant, than self-representation which is guaranteed to be flawed in a case where the defendant is unintelligent and mentally ill.

    A judge with a mind to be unfair can influence trial proceedings in myriad unfair ways from knowning incorrect rulings during trial that can’t be determined from the record alone to be an abuse of discretion to secret ex parte communications with the jury to tone of voice and emphasis in the delivery of the jury instructions.

    For that matter, if the prosecution is going to be unlawfully and unethically corrupting people anyway, why not simply bribe the court reporter? The court reporter is probably cheaper to corrupt, has a shorter set of ethical rules to contend with, and has skills that are more transferrable if caught and prohibited from further practice in that profession. After all, if critical points to make it into the record in the first place, that eliminate the need to buy off the appellate judiciary as well.

    A corrupt judge who is a government employee can already rule that someone is unfit to stand trial or requires mental health commitment for his or her personal safety, and incarcerate that person in a mental institution indefinitely, without a jury. There are indeed cases where it has been alleged that this has happened.

    No one disagrees that there is a right to mount a defense to criminal charges. In almost all cases this is done by a public defender, appointed counsel, paid and retained counsel, or pro bono counsel.

    The government already prohibits people from turning to the 99.7% of the people who aren’t admitted to the practice of law for counsel, and requires the other 0.3% to hold their offices only after receiving indoctrination for years in a certain way of thinking, passing an examination that shows that they have assimilated that way of thinking, swearing to uphold a particular set of legal and ethical obligations, and remaining subject to a loss of livelihood if a government employee determines that those ethical obligations have been breached. It is probably easier to run for public office in Iran than it is to be eligible to represent someone in a criminal trial.

    What is to stop the government? The honesty of judges and public defenders, and to a lesser extent the ethics of prosecutors and law enforcement in the discovery process. Not surprisingly, a large share of reversed convictions involve malfeasance by the prosecution or law enforcement on one hand, or incompetence by public defenders which a judge didn’t intervene to prevent on the other.

    You have to rely on someone to be honest sometime to have a meaningful system of justice.

    Comment by Andrew Oh-Willeke — March 27, 2008 @ 6:27 pm

  8. The standard of incompetency to stand trial has been applied in such an absurd manner–since the Hinckley trial–as to allow a huge number of incompetents to go to trial. The courts are reaping the consequences, one of which is that some of these incompetents forced to trial will choose to represent themselves. Now the State is asking the Supreme Court to dilute the right of self-representation in order to meet this largely self-made problem. There should be one standard for incompetence to stand trial and incompetence to represent one’s self. Defendants who are not competent to represent themselves are not competent to stand trial. Defendants who are sufficiently competent to stand trial are a fortiori competent to represent themselves.

    Comment by Peter Young — March 30, 2008 @ 3:09 pm

ACLU taps legal talent to defend alleged terrorists

ACLU taps legal talent to defend alleged terrorists

http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation/story/484043.html

crosenberg@MiamiHerald.com

One detainee leads a group as they bow during Islamic prayer, inside Camp 4 at the Camp Delta detention center at the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in this  Dec. 4, 2006, file photo.  This image was reviewed by a Pentagon official prior to release as a condition of media access at the prison camps.
BRENNAN LINSLEY / ASSOCIATED PRES
One detainee leads a group as they bow during Islamic prayer, inside Camp 4 at the Camp Delta detention center at the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in this Dec. 4, 2006, file photo. This image was reviewed by a Pentagon official prior to release as a condition of media access at the prison camps.

The American Civil Liberties Union, which for years has scorned the Pentagon's military commissions as ''kangaroo courts,'' announced Friday that it will mount an effort to provide top civilian defense attorneys for alleged terrorists facing trial at Guantánamo, notably the alleged mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Former Attorney General Janet Reno is among top lawyers who have endorsed the $8.5 million effort, which will helpdefray the expenses of civilian defense attorneys working on the terrorism cases. Under the military commissions scheme, the Pentagon will not reimburse volunteer civilian attorneys for their expenses.

ACLU executive director Anthony Romero said a major thrust of the effort will be to defend Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who military officials say confessed to masterminding the 9/11 attacks and several other terrorist actions.

Mohammed was held in secret CIA custody until September 2006, and the CIA has admitted waterboarding him while he was being questioned.

Mohammed's case ''is likely to raise the most significant issues of torture, hearsay evidence and access to counsel,'' said Anthony Romero, the ACLU executive director.

At the Pentagon, a war court spokesman said the Office of Military Commissions had not received details about the ACLU program.

But Air Force Capt. André Kok noted that the law governing the trials entitles each Guantánamo defendant to a military defense lawyer and that volunteer civilian attorneys can also participate, without government reimbursement.

''The system allows for that,'' said Kok. ``There's a mechanism set in place for them to become part of that pool of qualified attorneys.''

Eleven lawyers have agreed to defend Guantánamo detainees facing death penalty charges at the war court, said Romero, whose offices are eight blocks from the former World Trade Center, which was ''Ground Zero'' on Sept. 11, 2001.

Because the men have been cast by the White House as the most reviled enemies of America, the ACLU and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued high-profile endorsements of the effort including one from Reno, who served as President Clinton's attorney general for both of his terms and is the longest serving attorney general in U.S. history.

''This is the time to demonstrate to the world that the United States need not abandon its principles,'' said Reno, ``even as it seeks to ensure the safety of its citizens.''

The program described Friday is the result of a stealthy collaboration between the ACLU, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and uniformed U.S. military lawyers.

On Feb. 11, the Pentagon prosecutor filed proposed death-penalty charges against Mohammed and five other men as alleged co-conspirators in the 9/11 attacks.

Since then, Army Reserves Col. Steve David, who is the commissions' chief defense counsel, has been trying to build teams of military attorneys qualified to handle the complicated death penalty cases from the mostly inexperienced military judge advocates general assigned to his office.

David, an Indiana judge in civilian life, has said he wants to meet American Bar Association standards in the cases -- meaning assigning 12 government lawyers, six investigators and six paralegals. At the same time, the defense JAGs have been attending ABA death-penalty training classes.

The military commissions legal advisor, Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann, has said that the military commissions are not obliged to follow ABA standards.

Among those who've volunteered to defend the 9/11 conspirators are Idaho attorney David Nevin, whose previous cases include the successful defense of a Saudi charged with terrorism; New York attorney Joshua Dratel, who defended clients charged with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center prosecutions; and Denise LeBoeuf, a prominent New Orleans capital defender. Romero said one of the 11 lawyers has agreed to defend Mohammed at before the military commission, if he's allowed to see Mohammed in private at the remote base, and Mohammed agrees to accept his services.

Romero declined to name the attorney, but said that lawyer had already applied for the high-level security clearance required to meet with Mohammed, who is held in seclusion at the U.S. Navy base in Cuba.

According to military transcripts, Mohammed has confessed to plotting worldwide terror attacks as well as personally beheading Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.

The ACLU is calling its Guantánamo effort ''The John Adams Project.'' Adams, who became the second U.S. president, defended British soldiers at their trial for the 1770 Boston Massacre.

The program marks an about-face in ACLU policy, which has sent observers to the military commissions at Guantánamo but has consistently called them kangaroo courts.''

''The only way you can protect the system from being a complete sham is to make sure that they have a good defense,'' said Jennifer Daskal of Human Rights Watch, who also has been a commissions observer. ``And one way to do that is to have strong, zealous experienced lawyers.''

Romero said the group decided to champion the defense effort in response to the recent acceleration of military commission prosecution efforts, which some have said are timed for the 2008 campaign season.

The ACLU chose to focus on Mohammed's defense, Romero said, because he appears to be ``the government's top priority in the prosecution. And whether or not they are able to convict Khalid Sheik Mohammed under these rules may well determine the fate of the almost 300 other men who are detained at Guantáamo.''

Several South Florida criminal defense attorneys learned of the project on Friday and were inquiring about volunteering.

''Where do I sign up?'' said renowned South Florida criminal defense attorney Milton Hirsch.

He said he had no reservations about offering to defend men cast by the White House as al Qaeda terrorists. ``I have no idea whether they're terrorists. But I have a problem with the fact that my government has held them for five to six years without any process of law, any formal accusation, any access to a legal system that can afford them those rights for which America stands.''

Thursday, 3 April 2008

Kennedy allows inmate’s release


Kennedy allows inmate’s release


Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Thursday turned aside a plea by California officials, and cleared the way for the release of a state prison inmate who was convicted of a 1982 murder in Los Angeles. Kennedy had blocked a federal judge’s release order in the case of inmate Fred McCullough last Sunday, but on Thursday nullified his stay order and denied the state’s application “in all respects.”

McCullough has twice won rulings by the state parole board that he was suitable for release after becoming rehabilitated in prison. Both times, however, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger overruled the board, and found that the nature of the original crime justified McCullough’s continued imprisonment.

Kennedy’s order on Thursday can be found here. The Justice gave no indication of his reasoning.

McCullough is thus eligible for release while the state appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court a federal judge’s release decision.

Seven out of Texas lose in light of Medellin


Seven out of Texas lose in light of Medellin



Mar 31st, 2008

Following in the wake of Medellin, a slew of cert denials from Texas. AP notes

7 Mexican-born inmates on Texas’ death row lost their bids for appeal Monday before the U.S. Supreme Court, following the court’s ruling last week that another Mexican-born inmate’s case couldn’t be reopened despite an order from President Bush.

Justices last week voted 6-3 against hearing the case of Jose Medellin, convicted of the rape-slayings of 2 Houston teenagers 15 years ago, saying Bush overstepped his authority by trying to order Texas to reopen Medellin’s case. That decision removed a legal hurdle blocking Medellin’s execution.. . .

The 7 inmates whose cases were denied review Monday are among 14 native Mexicans on death row in Texas. Inmates whose cases were rejected include Cesar Fierro, one of the longest-serving condemned prisoners in the state. Fierro, 51, was convicted of the 1979 robbery-slaying of an El Paso taxi driver. He’s been on death row more than 28 years.

Other condemned prisoners to lose Monday:

-Ruben Cardenas, 37, convicted of the rape-slaying of a 16-year-old girl abducted from Edinburg in 1997.

-Felix Rocha, 31, convicted of the slaying and robbery of a security guard outside a Houston club in 1994.

-Virgilio Maldonado, 42, condemned for a 1995 robbery and slaying at a Houston apartment complex.

-Robert Ramos, 53, convicted of the 1992 slayings of his wife and 2 children at their home in Progreso in Hidalgo County.

-Humberto Leal Garcia, 35, condemned for the abduction, rape and fatal bludgeoning of a 16-year-old San Antonio girl in 1994.

-Ignacio Gomez, 38, convicted of the fatal shooting of 3 people in El Paso in 1996.

Friday, 28 March 2008

With injustice of AEDPA, presidential candidates must discuss death penalty



With injustice of AEDPA, presidential candidates must discuss death penalty


To the Editor:

The AEDPA law mentioned in Ben Jones’ column “Still, candidates avoid death-penalty debate” (3/26) is affecting my father, Alabama death row inmate, Thomas Arthur Z-427. Alabama is the only state in the United States that does not provide or guarantee attorneys for death row inmates during post-conviction appeals.

He did not have an attorney and his appeals were filed late (AEDPA law). He has never had his first Habeas Corpus Review or rule 32. In November 2007, DNA testing of the crime scene evidence was denied by the United States Supreme Court (USSC) because of the AEDPA Act.

My father was scheduled twice for execution: September and December 2006. The first was stayed because I put so much media attention on the governor, the second was stayed by the USSC while they awaiting their decision on cruel and unusual punishment.

What the USSC should be talking about is the AEDPA Act and how it is denying death row inmates their rights to new trials that could show evidence that can prove their innocence. There are two sets of victims when a crime is committed: the family and loved ones of the victim, and the family and loved ones of the condemned. Is either set going to have justice or closure if the state legally murders the wrong person? Now, that is cruel and unusual punishment.

Can you imagine how it feels to sit with your father just hours away from his legalized murder by the state when there is DNA testing that, if done, could prove his innocence? I can, because I had to do it twice. So did the family and loved ones of the victim. Troy Davis’ example exemplifies other failings of the AEDPA Act. But there are many more.

Both Davis and my father will be legally murdered by the state because they filed their paperwork late.

This is not justice. It is a flawed system that must be discussed by the presidential candidates.

Sherrie Stone

March 25

The writer is the daughter of Alabama death row inmate Thomas Arthur Z-427.

Wednesday, 26 March 2008

Ruling: Bush can't order hearing for condemned Mexican


SUPREME COURT | DEATH PENALTY CASE

Ruling: Bush can't order hearing for condemned Mexican

The Supreme Court sided with Texas against President Bush in denying an appeal for a Mexican national who is on Death Row in Texas.

McClatchy News Service

The Supreme Court ruled Wednesday against President Bush in a far-reaching legal dispute with his home state, concluding that the president can't order Texas courts to conduct a new hearing for a Mexican national who's on Death Row.

In a 6-3 decision, the court sided with the state of Texas in denying an appeal for José Ernesto Medellín, who's on Texas' Death Row for the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston 15 years ago.

The case had broad international reach and threatened to strain relations further between the United States and Mexico. The Mexican Embassy in Washington expressed disappointment with the ruling.

Bush was cast in an unlikely legal alliance with Medellín by insisting that Texas abide by an international treaty that requires those arrested abroad to have access to their country's consular officials. Medellín asserts that he was denied access to Mexican representatives.

In the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the justices upheld a 2006 ruling by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which held that Bush overstepped his constitutional authority through ''an intrusive exercise of power'' over the Texas court system.

Roberts said that the president's authority, ''as with the exercise of any governmental power,'' stemmed from an act of Congress or the Constitution. Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter dissented.

The ruling marked a victory for Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, whose office argued that Medellín waited too long to invoke his treaty claim and was grasping at the issue to avoid execution in a brutal crime that rocked Houston in 1993.

''Now, 15 years after two innocent teenage girls were brutally gang-raped and murdered, their grieving families are a step closer to justice,'' Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz said.

New York attorney Donald Frances Donovan, who represented Medellín at the request of the Mexican government, was traveling out of the country and unavailable to discuss his next legal step. But in a statement through his office, Donovan said the ruling constituted a ``departure from the original intent of the Constitution and over 200 years of enforcement of treaties by U.S. courts.''

Medellín, 33, remains at the Polunsky Unit in Livingston, Texas, one of 368 Death Row inmates, including nine women, who are awaiting execution in the state.

Texas, like other states, has a de facto moratorium on executions until the Supreme Court rules on a case from two Kentucky Death Row inmates challenging the constitutionality of lethal injections. Roe Wilson, a prosecutor in the Harris County district attorney's office, said the office wouldn't proceed with seeking an execution date for Medellín until after a ruling in the lethal-injection case.

Still, candidates avoid death-penalty debate


Still, candidates avoid death-penalty debate

Guest Columnist
Published Wednesday, March 26, 2008

As contenders for the presidency tailor their campaigns to address
predominately middle-class concerns — health care, the economy, Iraq

— they are giving short shrift to other issues that, though pressing,

fail to capture the attention of their primary demographic.

The rationale goes like this: If the core electorate — middle-class
America — does not care deeply about an issue, why expend the
political capital necessary to tackle it? And why risk provoking
controversy?

Thus, it is of little surprise that candidates have avoided
discussing the plight of inmates on death row. Although all the
remaining major party candidates hold a position on the death penalty
— they support it — rarely do they explain why. In fact, neither
John
McCain
nor Hillary Clinton even mention the topic of capital
punishment on their Web sites.

Such lack of concern is troubling given the persistent problems
plaguing the death penalty in this country. Firstly, time and again
studies show that race influences the likelihood that an individual
convicted of murder will receive a death sentence. There is also
evidence suggesting that the number of wrongfully convicted
individuals on death row is alarmingly high. Since 1973, 125 death
row inmates
have been released on account of evidence overturning
their convictions.

These disturbing statistics show that the death penalty consistently
falls victim to arbitrariness and discrimination. It is for these
very reasons that, in 1972, the Supreme Court declared existing death
penalty statutes to be unconstitutional. Although the high court
reinstituted the penalty in 1976 after states revised their statutes,
30 years later, there is little to suggest that the practice has
improved. Capital punishment — what is becoming America’s new
“peculiar” institution in the eyes of the rest of the world —
remains
a deeply flawed practice.

Legislation in recent decades has had the effect of only exacerbating
the injustices of the death penalty. Particularly troubling has been
the impact of the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), a law deemed by some as a more egregious assault on civil
liberties
than the Patriot Act. This legislation, signed into law by
President Clinton, had, as one of its principal goals, shortening the
time between conviction and execution for those sentenced to death.
In order to accomplished this goal, the habeas corpus rights of death
row inmates
was severely limited.

To be sure, the law has expedited the executions of a number of
rapists and murderers. But it has also had the effect of cutting
short the appeals process for possibly innocent individuals —
individuals such as Troy Anthony Davis.

Davis currently sits on Georgia’s death row for the murder of an off-

duty police officer. Barring an extraordinary action by the President
or the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Davis will die,
since the AEDPA prevents him from filing further appeals. Never mind
the seven out of nine witnesses recanting their testimony against
Davis since the trial, allegations of police coercion of the
witnesses and the complete of lack physical evidence tying Davis to
the crime.

To say that the situation faced by Davis is common would be an
exaggeration. But with the AEDPA in place, it occurs more often than
one may think. The Davis case should have sparked — and perhaps still

can — a national debate about the unwanted consequences of federal
and state death penalty laws.

Unfortunately, the candidates have failed thus far to lead the
debate. McCain has never wavered in his support of the AEDPA, and
Clinton has made no indication that she disagrees with her husband’s

support for the law. Obama, though more ready to admit problems in
the administration of capital punishment, has offered little in the
way of substantive measures for remedying these problems on a
national scale.

A case currently before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of
lethal injection holds the possibility of bringing the death penalty
back into the public consciousness. It would be naive to believe,
however, that the candidates, on their own initiative, will draw
attention to a potentially explosive issue like the death penalty.
Presently, there is no electoral incentive to do so.

It is therefore important that during this campaign season we force
the candidates to refocus on the dismal reality of the death penalty.
To challenge the view that, as Obama puts it, a community needs to be
able to express “the full measure of its outrage by meting out the
ultimate punishment.” Is not the true audacity of hope rather
believing in — and fighting for — a community that does not have to

validate itself through revenge?

Ben Jones is a first-year political-science graduate student. He is a
member of the Amnesty International club at Yale.



http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/24027

Nebraska retains the death penalty


Nebraska retains the death penalty

Nebraska lawmakers rejected an attempt to repeal the death penalty on Tuesday, a month after courts left the state with no way to execute its killers.

Twenty senators in the unicameral, officially nonpartisan Legislature voted for the bill to change the maximum penalty to life in prison without possibility of parole. It would have taken 25 votes to advance the debate.

The state Supreme Court ruled in February that the electric chair, the state's sole means of putting inmates to death, amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.

The most likely alternative - lethal injection - is under federal review in a Kentucky case that questions whether the drugs commonly used risk causing excruciating pain, in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to rule by June.

Nebraska Gov. Dave Heineman, a Republican who had been expected to veto the bill if it passed, applauded the vote and said the focus now should be on deciding a legal method of execution for the state.

Sen. Ernie Chambers of Omaha introduced the bill to repeal the death penalty, as he has every year for the past three decades. But term limits will push him out of the Capitol after this session.

"Years down the line I can live a lot more comfortably with what I've done these 38 years than what my colleagues can do," Chambers said.

The last execution in the state was in 1997, when Robert Williams was put to death by electrocution for killing three women.

Death row inmate Carey Dean Moore was scheduled to be executed in May last year, but the state Supreme Court halted it less than a week beforehand. The court said at the time it must reconsider whether the electric chair amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, given a "changing legal landscape."

The court said in its February opinion that evidence shows electrocution inflicts "intense pain and agonizing suffering" and that it "has proven itself to be a dinosaur more befitting the laboratory of Baron Frankenstein" than a state prison.

The state attorney general has asked state Supreme Court justices to reconsider their ruling on the electric chair, although he said he doesn't expect them to change their minds. He's still considering an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Ten men now sit on Nebraska's death row.

Monday, 24 March 2008

Death penalty debate coming back to the Capitol


Death penalty debate coming back to the Capitol

Associated Press - March 24, 2008 4:45 PM ET

OMAHA, Neb. (AP) - Opponents of the death penalty will rally at the Capitol tomorrow morning.

Mark Weddleton of Nebraskans Against the Death Penalty says he hopes Nebraska's senators will reflect the changing mood in the state.

Senator Brad Ashford, chairman of the Legislature's Judiciary Committee, will lead this year's debate.

Ashford says he's not counting votes yet. He says it's "a down-in-the-gut kind of thing."

The bill from Senator Ernie Chambers (LB1063) would change the maximum penalty to life in prison without possibility of parole. Chambers has introduced similar bills for nearly four decades, but the closest he came to having the law changed was in 1979, when his bill passed on a 26-22 vote but was vetoed by then-Governor Charley Thone.

Governor Dave Heineman said he'll veto the bill if it passes. Senators would need 30 votes for an override.

On the Net:

Nebraska Legislature: http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov


Vigil against capital punishment is today


Vigil against capital punishment is today

staff reports • Argus Leader • March 21, 2008



The 11th annual Good Friday vigil against the death penalty is set for noon to 1 p.m. today at the state penitentiary.

The event, hosted by the South Dakota Peace and Justice Center, will be near the flagpole at the entrance to the Jamison Annex, just north of the main prison.

The service includes a homily by the Rev. Peter Holland, songs and a remembrance ceremony for victims of murder and those on death row.

South Dakota executed its first inmate in 60 years last July when Elijah Page was killed by lethal injection.

Three other men remain on death row in the state: Donald Moeller, Charles Rhines and Briley Piper.

No urgency this time on executions


No urgency this time on executions

Updated 03/24/2008 11:31:41 AM EDT
LINCOLN -- The Nebraska Supreme Court last month decided to pull the plug on the electric chair. This week, the Legislature will consider whether to close the execution chamber for good.


Lawmakers on Tuesday will
begin debating Legislative Bill 1063, which would abolish the death penalty and replace it with a sentence of life in prison without parole.

It will be the third time in a little more than a year that the Legislature has debated capital punishment.

In 2007, lawmakers fell one vote short of advancing, from first-round debate, a bill to repeal the death penalty. Death penalty opponents then regrouped and proposed to sharply restrict death sentences. That fell two votes short of advancing.

The 2007 debate came before the State Supreme Court's decision to ban the electric chair, before the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case challenging the constitutionality of lethal injection, and before New Jersey became the first state in more than 40 years to abolish capital punishment.

State Sen. Ernie Chambers of Omaha, long the Legislature's leading opponent of the death penalty, already has declared a victory of sorts.

For more than 10 years, Chambers had blocked legislation to switch from the electric chair to lethal injection. In the aftermath of electrocution being ruled cruel and unusual punishment, Nebraska is left without a legal means to carry out executions.

Chambers has vowed to keep any new execution method from being approved before he leaves the Legislature at year's end because of term limits.

Amy Miller, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union-Nebraska and board president of Nebraskans Against the Death Penalty, said opponents are in a better position to defeat capital punishment.

"We're fighting a proactive battle because we want to eliminate the death penalty. But people who want to keep the death penalty have to come up with a new recipe for death,'' she said.

"We need to just say we're done and walk away from it,'' she said.

Attorney General Jon Bruning said a proposal to authorize lethal injection will be put before lawmakers in 2009 at the latest. It's also possible that Gov. Dave Heineman could call the Legislature into a special session to consider lethal injection, Bruning said.

"Lawmakers should vote no on the repeal and on any amendments that claim to be a compromise,'' Bruning said. "This is one of these issues where you're either for it or you're not. There really isn't a lot of middle ground on the death penalty.''

Bruning and other death penalty supporters dispute any argument that Nebraskans may be turning away from supporting the death penalty.

Sen. Scott Lautenbaugh of Omaha noted that the Supreme Court disapproved only of the method of execution, not the death penalty itself.

"I am a strong supporter of the death penalty, and nothing has occurred to change that,'' Lautenbaugh said. "I feel I am in tune with my district wants.''

Some lawmakers said Nebraska's lack of an execution method takes the urgency away from calls to repeal capital punishment.

"It's been 10 years since we've had an execution. We don't have a workable death penalty. Let's still leave it on the books,'' said Sen. Carroll Burling of Kenesaw.

Death penalty opponents may be unable to garner more than the 24 votes they collected last year. In a pre-session survey of lawmakers, 26 of the 49 told The World-Herald they would vote to keep capital punishment.

Heineman has promised to veto a repeal bill if it reaches his desk, meaning death penalty opponents would need at least a 30-vote majority to override a veto if they are to succeed.

"This issue is difficult and emotional, but ultimately our justice system operates most effectively if we do not tolerate atrocious criminal acts,'' Heineman said.

In interviews, some lawmakers who previously voted to repeal indicated they may be wavering.

"I don't know how I'm going to vote,'' said Sen. Kent Rogert of Tekamah. "It will pull me back and forth the entire day. It always does.''

Sen. Brad Ashford of Omaha will lead the debate, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee. He said the death penalty does not lend itself to vote-counting in advance.

"It's a life-and-death issue,'' he said. "It will be decided on the floor as part of the debate.''

Activist walks to abolish death penalty


Activist walks to abolish death penalty katia-r
Updated: 2008-03-21 23:10:59-06
Andre Latallade, hip-hop artist and prison rights activist, also known as Capital-X, will walk from New Jersey to Texas to advocate for the abolishment of capital punishment in the US. He will walk 1700 miles through 10 of the states with the highest execution rate. His objective is to reach the governor's mansion in Austin, TX--what he dubs the "busiest killing state in the country--before the Supreme Court's ruling on whether death by lethal injection is a cruel and unusual punishment.

In September 2007 Ralph Baze and Thomas Clyde Bowling Jr., two death row inmates in Kentucky after losing an appeal in the Kentucky Supreme Court were able to get the Supreme Court to consider the fundamental question of whether the mix of drugs used in Kentucky and elsewhere violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Currently there is a moratorium on state-sanctioned executions while the Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of that method of execution.

Latallade will begin his "Walk for Life" at 5 a.m. on March 31, 2008 at the state house in Trenton, NJ, the first state to abolish the death penalty in the last 40 years. He estimates that it will take 54 days walking eight hours per day at 3.5 miles per hour with a respite from April 18-20 in order to participate in a panel discussion at the Hip Hop Association's HHEAL Festival in the Bronx, NY.

Uniting the families of murder victims and the families of the condemned, Latallade in building bridges between the two groups is calling for the acceptance of life sentences without parole instead of death sentences for those found guilty of the crime.

A daily video blog documenting Latallade's journey will be posted here. To contact Latallade send an e-mail here.

Editor's notes: According to a list compiled by The Missourinet, currently, 46 men (25 white, 21 black) await execution dates in Missouri, a state where death by lethal injection was upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court. One of the inmates, Michael Taylor, was granted a stay of execution in February 2006 based upon his claim that the method of execution by lethal injection was cruel and unusual punishment. But does it fit the crime? Taylor and a friend named Roderick Nunley kidnapped a 15-year old girl named Ann Harrison while she was waiting at a school bus stop in Kansas City. Taylor raped her. The two perpetrators stabbed her over a dozen times causing her eventual death.

Joe Amrine of Kansas City, however, spent 17 years on death row in Missouri after wrongly being convicted of stabbing to death a fellow inmate. He is one of over 125 men and women exonerated for capital crime nationwide, since the advent of DNA testing.

Are legislators up to the test?

Are legislators up to the test?

Monday, March 24, 2008

THE ISSUE: Alabama is one of only a handful of states without a law to help wrongly convicted people get access to DNA testing. Our Legislature should change that.

People convicted of crimes before DNA science had been developed ought to have access to testing now if it could prove their innocence.

Unfortunately, Alabama does not make it easy for them to do so.

It is one of only seven states without a law setting up a process for prisoners to get belated DNA testing of the evidence used to convict them.

For several years running, state Sen. Hank Sanders, D-Selma, has introduced a bill that would establish a legal procedure for inmates to get DNA tests. This year is no exception. But as in past years, the measure doesn't appear to be a big priority for our lawmakers. That's a shame.

Providing inmates a forum to prove their innocence isn't a way to coddle criminals. It's a way to ensure the right people are locked up for the right crimes. If one person is wrongly convicted of a crime, it stands to reason that another person has wrongly escaped punishment for it.

Across the nation, more than 100 inmates have been cleared of crimes through DNA testing long after their trials. In a number of these cases, DNA testing not only cleared an innocent person, but implicated a repeat offender whose DNA already was on file.

It's such a win-win that people might think courts routinely order DNA testing in old cases even without a special law making it available. But that's not true. There are sometimes legal roadblocks to doing so, and prosecutors almost always resist letting inmates get DNA testing on old evidence.

Even in death penalty cases, there has been a reluctance to grant DNA tests. Gov. Bob Riley, who has special power to intervene in those cases, has shown no willingness whatsoever to consider condemned inmates' pleas for DNA testing.

In the case of Death Row inmate Thomas Arthur, for instance, Riley has seemed to run through a series of excuses not to order DNA testing - none of which hold up to close scrutiny.

Attorney General Troy King also routinely opposes such requests, usually arguing there's no doubt about a particular defendant's guilt. So why not do the test and confirm it?

The DNA law would at least somewhat remove the decision from politics and politicians who are always so fearful to appear soft on crime. If they are truly interested in seeing justice done, they should be leading the charge for the Legislature to pass a law clearing the way for DNA testing in old cases.

There would almost certainly be no crush of inmates demanding and getting DNA tests.

First of all, the law would have no effect on cases not involving biological evidence such as semen or blood. Second, inmates who want DNA testing would have to claim they are innocent and would be subject to perjury prosecution if they were found to be lying. Third, inmates would have to meet several other criteria to win court approval for DNA testing.

Judges don't have to grant DNA testing, for instance, if they determine there is no "reasonable possibility" the inmate would be exonerated.

The structure is sound on every measure, and the goal is an honorable one. Who knows? It might not result in a single exoneration. But at least Alabamians would have more confidence they're not paying to keep innocent people behind bars for want of a DNA test that could clear them.

The issue is in the hands of legislators. Let's hope they are up to the test.

HOW LETHAL INJECTION REFORM CONSTITUTES IMPERMISSIBLE RESEARCH ON PRISONERS


http://www.floridasupport.us/Baze/impermissibleresearch.htm


http://www.floridasupport.us/Baze/2008.shaw.pdf



HOW LETHAL INJECTION REFORM CONSTITUTES IMPERMISSIBLE RESEARCH ON PRISONERS

Seema Shah**

This essay exposes how recent attempts at lethal injection reform have involved unethical

and illegal research on prisoners. States are varying the doses and types of drugs used,

developing methods designed for non-medical professionals to administer medical procedures,

and gathering data or making provisions for the gathering of data to learn from executions gone

wrong. When individual prisoners are executed under these conditions, states are conducting

research on them. Conducting research or experimentation on prisoners in the process of reform

is problematic because it violates ethical frameworks and state laws.

The Supreme Court has recently taken up the challenge of elucidating the standard for

determining the constitutionality of lethal injection. If the Court suggests an approach to lethal

injection reform that is akin to some of the more thoughtful and cautious approaches other courts

have proposed, the Court’s decision may also contravene state laws or ethical precepts regarding

research with prisoners. Thus, this paper provides important limitations on the kinds of reform

that may be permissible and outlines the open questions that must be addressed before it can be

determined whether the risks and uncertainties involved in lethal injection can be remedied.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in order to elucidate a standard for

applying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to determine the

constitutionality of execution by lethal injection.1 Before this decision, execution by lethal

injection had come to a halt in eleven states as a result of dramatic evidence of the potential

problems with its implementation.2 These problems led some courts to conclude that, as currently

practiced, the lethal injection system is broken and runs a substantial risk of involving cruel and

**Faculty, Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health and Contractor, Henry Jackson

Foundation for Military Medicine; J.D. Stanford Law School. I am thankful to the following individuals

for their contribution to this piece: Mark Heath, Nisha Shah, Paul Litton, Lisa McCalmont, Deborah

Denno, Harry Surden, Jonathan Rackoff, Eric Chwang, Zeke Emanuel, Colleen Denny, Rebecca Wolitz,

Govind Persad, Namrata Kotwani, Emily Abdoler, Ty Alper, and the members of the Department of

Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. In addition, many prison officials and administrators

provided information about their policies or procedures or helped in navigating their information systems,

for which I am also grateful. Finally, the opinions expressed herein are my own. They do not represent

any position or policy of the National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service, or Department of Health

and Human Services.

1 Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 9066, at *1 (U.S. September 25, 2007).